International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Development-– Volume 9 Issue 3, May-June 2026
Available at www.ijsred.com

RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

Context-Aware AIOps Framework for Detecting Hidden Anomalies Using Multi-Source System Logs

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ABSTRACT:

Modern distributed IT systems generate enormous volumes of operational data every second. Server logs, application event streams, and infrastructure monitoring feeds collectively encode the real-time health of any enterprise platform. Yet the vast majority of operations teams still rely on threshold-based alerting rules that fire only after a problem has already become visible, by which point substantial damage in terms of downtime, user impact, or data integrity may already have occurred. The challenge is not a shortage of data; it is a shortage of context.

This paper presents a Context-Aware AIOps framework designed to address that gap by detecting hidden anomalies across multi-source system logs before they escalate into incidents. The framework ingests heterogeneous log streams from server infrastructure, application runtimes, and monitoring exporters, correlates them through a shared semantic model, and applies a combination of Isolation Forest-based outlier detection and Autoencoder-driven reconstruction error analysis to identify behavioral patterns that deviate from learned baselines. A context enrichment layer associates raw anomaly signals with service topology, temporal patterns, and historical incident fingerprints to suppress false positives and surface only those deviations that warrant operator attention.

We implemented the framework using Python, Pandas, Scikit-learn, and a Flask-based monitoring dashboard, and evaluated it on a synthetic dataset of 120,000 log events generated to reflect realistic enterprise workloads. The system achieved an anomaly detection accuracy of 94.3%, a precision of 92.7%, and a recall of 95.1%, outperforming standalone threshold-based detection by a margin of 21 percentage points in F1 score. The results suggest that context-aware multi-source log correlation is a practical and effective approach for improving anomaly detection in production AIOps deployments.

Keywords: *AIOps, Anomaly Detection, System Logs, Isolation Forest, Autoencoder, Context-Aware Analysis, Multi-Source Logs, Machine Learning, Scikit-learn, Flask Dashboard, Log Correlation, Incident Prediction*

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1. INTRODUCTION

Every production system tells a story through its logs. The problem is that no single log stream tells the complete story. A web application server recording HTTP 500 errors may be responding to a degraded database connection that itself was triggered by a background job consuming abnormal memory. Each of these events, seen in isolation, may fall below alerting thresholds or appear unremarkable. Seen together, in temporal and topological context, they describe an impending outage with reasonable clarity. The key challenge in modern IT operations is developing the analytical machinery to see that larger picture reliably and in real time.

The field of Artificial Intelligence for IT Operations, commonly abbreviated AIOps, has grown rapidly since Gartner first defined the category in 2017 [1]. The promise of AIOps is straightforward: apply machine learning and big data techniques to the operational data that IT systems already generate, and extract actionable insight from it at a speed and scale that human analysts cannot match. In practice, most commercial and research AIOps implementations have focused on individual data

modalities, log parsing, metric forecasting, or alert correlation, without deeply integrating the semantic context that gives those signals meaning.

Multi-source log analysis is one area where this limitation is particularly acute. Enterprise systems typically produce logs from dozens of distinct sources, each with its own format, vocabulary, and temporal granularity. Correlating these logs into a coherent operational picture requires more than simply aggregating them into a common store. It requires understanding how the events in one log relate causally and temporally to events in others, and how the combination of signals from multiple sources can indicate a failure mode that no individual source would reveal on its own.

This paper proposes and evaluates a Context-Aware AIOps framework that addresses this challenge. Our approach makes three specific contributions. First, we define a multi-source log ingestion and normalization pipeline that harmonizes server logs, application logs, and monitoring logs into a unified event schema suitable for downstream machine learning. Second, we introduce a context enrichment layer that augments raw log events with service topology metadata, temporal behavioral baselines, and historical anomaly fingerprints, enabling the anomaly detection models to distinguish genuine operational deviations from routine variability. Third, we evaluate two complementary anomaly detection techniques, Isolation Forest for high-dimensional outlier scoring and Autoencoder-based reconstruction error analysis for sequential pattern anomalies, and demonstrate that their combination outperforms either approach applied independently.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on AIOps, log analysis, and anomaly detection. Sections 3 through 5 describe the existing system, its limitations, and our proposed solution. Section 6 presents the methodology in detail. Sections 7 through 12 describe the system architecture, data collection, machine learning techniques, context analysis, and implementation. Section 13 discusses the experimental results. Sections 14 through 17 address advantages, limitations, and future directions. Section 18 concludes

2. LITRATURE SURVEY

2.1 Foundations of AIOps

Dang et al. [2] provide a practitioner-focused survey of AIOps as deployed at a major technology company, identifying the gap between academic algorithmic research and the messy realities of production telemetry. Their observation that effective AIOps systems must tolerate noisy, incomplete, and inconsistently formatted data sources directly shaped the preprocessing priorities in our framework. The paper also underscores the importance of explainability, a theme we return to in our context enrichment layer.

He et al. [3] introduced Drain, a streaming log parsing algorithm that efficiently extracts structured templates from unstructured text logs. Drain and its successors have become a standard preprocessing step in log-based anomaly detection pipelines. Our framework builds on this lineage by extending template extraction with semantic tagging that maps parsed events to service components in the operational topology graph.

2.2 Log-Based Anomaly Detection

Du et al. [4] proposed DeepLog, which treats system logs as execution sequences and uses a Long Short-Term Memory network to detect deviations from expected control flow. DeepLog was influential in demonstrating that sequential modeling of log data yields strong anomaly detection performance, particularly for detecting abnormal system call sequences. Our Autoencoder component draws conceptual inspiration from this sequential modeling paradigm while offering a simpler training procedure and more stable performance on shorter log windows.

Zhang et al. [5] later extended log-based anomaly detection with LogRobust, which addresses the vocabulary drift problem: log templates change as software evolves, and models trained on historical logs may misclassify new but benign events as anomalies. Their use of semantic embeddings to represent log events in a stable semantic space informed our approach to cross-version log normalization.

2.3 Isolation Forest and Unsupervised Outlier Detection

Liu et al. [6] originally proposed Isolation Forest as a tree-ensemble method for anomaly detection that exploits the observation that anomalous points are, by definition, easier to isolate than normal ones. The algorithm scales well to high-dimensional data and requires no labeled training examples, which makes it particularly well-suited to operational log data where labeled anomalies are rare and expensive to obtain. Several studies have applied Isolation Forest to network intrusion detection and cloud resource anomaly detection with strong results [7][8].

Chandola et al. [9] provide a comprehensive taxonomy of anomaly detection techniques across supervised, semi-supervised, and unsupervised paradigms. Their framework for categorizing contextual anomalies, where

a data point is anomalous only in relation to its context, directly motivated the context enrichment layer in our proposed system.

2.4 Multi-Source Correlation and Root Cause Analysis

Chen et al. [10] addressed the problem of alert storm correlation in microservice architectures, showing that graph-based dependency modeling significantly improves the signal-to-noise ratio in alert streams. Their work on service dependency graphs influenced the topology metadata we incorporate into our context enrichment layer. Similarly, Wang et al. [11] demonstrated that cross-layer correlation of metrics, logs, and traces reduces false positive rates in anomaly detection by nearly 40% compared to single-layer analysis, providing strong motivation for our multi-source approach.

2.5 The Gap This Paper Addresses

Despite this rich body of work, most existing systems treat log sources independently and apply generic anomaly detection without service-level context. The specific combination of multi-source log correlation, context enrichment using topology and temporal baselines, and ensemble anomaly detection within a single deployable framework has not been systematically evaluated. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap with a concrete, implementable, and empirically validated design.

3. EXISTING SYSTEM

The predominant approach in production IT operations today combines rule-based monitoring tools with single-source log aggregation platforms. Operators configure threshold rules in monitoring systems such as Nagios, Zabbix, or Prometheus Alertmanager: when CPU utilization exceeds 85%, trigger an alert; when HTTP error rate crosses 5%, page the on-call engineer. These rules are manually authored, require domain expertise to calibrate, and must be updated whenever the system being monitored changes.

Log aggregation is typically handled by platforms in the ELK stack family, where Logstash or Filebeat collects logs from individual hosts, Elasticsearch indexes and stores them, and Kibana provides search and visualization. These stacks are powerful for investigative analysis after an incident has been detected, but they are not designed for real-time anomaly detection. Operators perform manual searches over log data during incident response rather than receiving proactive anomaly signals from the log stream itself.

Some organizations augment these foundations with commercial APM tools such as Datadog, New Relic, or Dynatrace, which offer built-in anomaly detection for metric streams. However, even these advanced platforms focus primarily on individual metric time series and do not deeply correlate log events across service boundaries. Anomaly detection in these tools is typically applied to numerical metrics rather than to the structured or semi-structured log events that carry the richest operational semantics.

The result is an operational posture that is fundamentally reactive. Teams become aware of problems when dashboards turn red or pagers fire, at which point the system has already failed. Post-mortems regularly identify log evidence that, in retrospect, clearly indicated the impending failure hours before the outage. The existing system provides no mechanism for connecting those dots automatically and prospectively.

4. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The central problem this paper addresses is the inability of existing IT operations tooling to detect hidden anomalies across multi-source system logs in a context-aware manner. This problem has three distinct dimensions.

First, there is the heterogeneity problem. Enterprise IT systems produce logs in dozens of different formats: Apache combined log format, JSON-structured application event logs, syslog-formatted OS events, and proprietary monitoring exporter formats. These sources share no common schema, use different timestamp formats, and employ different vocabularies for describing similar operational events. Correlating them requires a normalization layer that does not exist in most production deployments.

Second, there is the context blindness problem. Even when logs are aggregated into a common store, anomaly detection is typically applied to individual log streams without knowledge of the service topology, the time of day, the current deployment state, or the historical behavioral baseline for the component in question. An elevated error rate at 3 a.m. during a scheduled maintenance window is not the same signal as an identical error rate on a Tuesday afternoon following a production deployment. Without that context, automated detection systems generate either too many false positives, by flagging expected variations as anomalies, or too many false negatives, by establishing baselines that are too lenient to catch genuine deviations.

Third, there is the correlation gap. Hidden anomalies, the class of incidents this paper specifically targets, are those where no single log source shows a clearly alarming signal, but the combination of subtle deviations across multiple sources indicates an emerging failure. Existing tools are not designed to detect this class of anomaly because they analyze log sources independently rather than in combination.

These three problems collectively explain why organizations with sophisticated monitoring stacks continue to experience undetected anomalies that escalate into major incidents. The problem is not a lack of data. It is a lack of integrated, context-aware analysis applied to the data that already exists.

5. PROPOSED SYSTEM

We propose a Context-Aware AIOps framework that addresses each of the three problem dimensions identified above through a layered pipeline architecture. The framework is designed to be deployable alongside existing monitoring infrastructure rather than replacing it, and to provide actionable anomaly signals to operators through a dedicated dashboard.

The proposed system ingests log streams from three source categories: server infrastructure logs, application runtime logs, and monitoring exporter logs. A unified ingestion pipeline normalizes these streams into a common event schema and routes them to a context enrichment engine, which augments each event with service topology metadata, temporal behavioral context, and historical anomaly fingerprints.

Enriched events are passed to a dual-model anomaly detection layer. An Isolation Forest model operates on feature vectors derived from time-windowed log statistics and flags individual events or windows as potential outliers based on their isolation score. In parallel, a trained Autoencoder model processes sequential log event embeddings and identifies anomalies through reconstruction error: events that the model cannot reconstruct accurately are likely to represent deviations from the learned normal patterns. Anomalies identified by either model are passed to a correlation engine that evaluates whether multiple co-occurring anomaly signals across different log sources constitute a compound anomaly indicative of a systemic issue.

The output of the framework is a ranked list of anomaly signals with severity scores, contextual explanations, and links to the specific log events that contributed to each detection. These are surfaced through a Flask-based web dashboard that provides both real-time anomaly feeds and historical trend analysis. Operators can configure notification channels for high-severity detections and access drill-down views that show the correlated evidence underlying each alert.

6. METHODOLOGY

6.1 Overall Approach

Our methodology follows a pipeline architecture in which each stage has clear input and output contracts, enabling independent development, testing, and replacement of individual components. The pipeline consists of five stages: log ingestion and normalization, context enrichment, feature engineering, anomaly detection, and signal correlation and ranking. We describe each stage in the sections that follow.

6.2 Log Ingestion and Normalization

Raw log streams are consumed from three source types. Server logs include syslog events, kernel messages, authentication logs, and process accounting records. Application logs include web server access and error logs, database query logs, application framework event logs, and custom application audit trails. Monitoring logs include Prometheus metric scrape event logs, health check probe records, and alert state transition logs exported from monitoring platforms.

Each source is processed by a source-specific parser that extracts a canonical set of fields: timestamp, source identifier, severity level, component name, event template identifier, and a variable-length set of extracted key-value parameters. The parsed events are stored in a normalized event store backed by a time-series indexed data structure to support efficient windowed queries.

6.3 Context Enrichment

Each normalized event is enriched with three categories of contextual metadata. Service topology context maps the source identifier to a node in a dependency graph that encodes the calling relationships between system components. This graph is maintained separately and updated at deployment time. Temporal context records the hour of day, day of week, and distance in time from the most recent deployment event for the associated service. Historical baseline context computes the Z-score of key event statistics relative to an exponentially weighted moving average calculated over the preceding 7-day window.

6.4 Feature Engineering

Features are computed over 5-minute rolling windows aggregated at the service level. For each window and

service, we compute: total event count, error event fraction, unique template count, mean inter-event interval, standard deviation of severity scores, count of events exceeding Z-score threshold, and topology-weighted event propagation score. The topology-weighted score reflects how anomalous events in upstream services may be correlated with events in the window's target service.

6.5 Anomaly Detection Models

We train an Isolation Forest model with 200 estimators and a contamination rate of 5% on 14 days of historical feature vectors. At inference time, the model scores each new feature vector and flags windows with isolation scores below a tuned threshold as candidate anomalies. In parallel, an Autoencoder with two encoder layers (128 and 64 units) and two decoder layers (64 and 128 units) is trained on normal log event sequences. At inference time, reconstruction error above the 99th percentile of training error is treated as an anomaly signal.

6.6 Signal Correlation and Ranking

Anomaly signals from the two models are correlated temporally and topologically. A compound anomaly is declared when two or more services emit independent anomaly signals within a 10-minute window, weighted by the topology propagation score between the affected services. Compound anomalies are ranked by a composite severity score incorporating signal strength, service criticality, and recency, and surfaced to the operator dashboard with a structured explanation.

7. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The overall architecture of the proposed framework is organized into five horizontal layers, each of which communicates with adjacent layers through well-defined interfaces. Figure 1 provides a conceptual representation of the architecture.

The Data Source Layer comprises the heterogeneous log producers in the monitored environment: Linux servers, web application servers, microservice instances, relational and NoSQL databases, and Prometheus-compatible exporters. Each source emits logs at its native rate and format.

The Ingestion and Normalization Layer collects raw log streams using Filebeat agents deployed on each source host, and routes them to a central Logstash pipeline. Source-specific Grok patterns and custom filter plugins perform format normalization, timestamp standardization, and field extraction. Normalized events are indexed in Elasticsearch and simultaneously published to a Kafka topic for real-time processing.

The Context Enrichment Layer is a Python service that consumes from the Kafka topic and enriches each event with topology, temporal, and baseline context as described in Section 6.3. Enriched events are written to a separate Elasticsearch index and to an in-memory Redis cache that supports low-latency feature computation.

The Analytics Layer contains the Isolation Forest and Autoencoder models, the feature engineering pipeline, and the signal correlation engine. This layer is implemented as a set of Python microservices that poll Redis for new enriched event windows and publish anomaly signals to an anomaly event queue. The Scikit-learn library provides the Isolation Forest implementation; the Autoencoder is implemented in Keras.

The Presentation Layer is a Flask web application that reads from the anomaly event queue, maintains a ranked anomaly feed, and provides a browser-based dashboard with real-time update via WebSocket push. The dashboard displays the current anomaly feed, a service topology map with color-coded anomaly overlays, time-series charts of key operational metrics, and detailed evidence views for individual anomaly signals.

8. DATA COLLECTION AND PREPROCESSING

For our experiments, we constructed a synthetic log dataset of 120,000 events generated to reflect realistic enterprise workload patterns across a simulated five-service microservice application. The application consists of a frontend gateway service, an authentication service, an order processing service, a database access service, and a background job scheduler.

Normal log events were generated using statistical models calibrated against publicly available log datasets from the HDFS log dataset collection [12] and the BGL supercomputer log benchmark [13]. These models capture realistic inter-event timing distributions, event type frequency distributions, and diurnal activity patterns. Anomalous events were injected at a rate of approximately 5% of total events, distributed across five anomaly categories: memory leak manifestation in the order service, cascading error propagation from a failed database connection, authentication service latency spike, abnormal background job scheduling frequency, and a multi-service correlated slowdown simulating a network partition.

Preprocessing steps applied to the raw log data included timestamp normalization to UTC, log template extraction using the Drain algorithm, deduplication of burst log events within 100-millisecond windows, removal of log events with missing mandatory fields, and encoding of

categorical fields using label encoding for severity levels and one-hot encoding for service identifiers. Numerical features were standardized using Z-score normalization computed over the training split.

The dataset was split 70/15/15 for training, validation, and test sets respectively, stratified to ensure proportional representation of each anomaly category in all splits. The training set was used exclusively for model fitting and threshold calibration; the validation set for hyperparameter selection; and the test set for final performance evaluation.

Table 1: Dataset Summary

Parameter	Value
Total Log Events	120,000
Normal Events	114,000 (95%)
Anomalous Events	6,000 (5%)
Anomaly Categories	5 (Memory Leak, Cascading Error, Latency Spike, Scheduling, Multi-Service)
Source Services	5 (Gateway, Auth, Orders, Database, Scheduler)
Time Span Simulated	14 days
Training / Validation / Test Split	70% / 15% / 15%
Log Sources Per Service	3 (Server, Application, Monitoring)

9. MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES USED

9.1 Isolation Forest

Isolation Forest is an ensemble-based anomaly detection method that works by recursively partitioning the feature space using randomly selected split dimensions and split values. Anomalous points, being sparse and distinct in feature space, tend to be isolated in fewer partitions than normal points. The anomaly score for a sample is computed from the average depth at which it is isolated across all trees in the ensemble.

In our implementation, the Isolation Forest is trained on the 14-dimensional feature vectors described in Section 6.4. We use 200 estimators to ensure stable score estimates and set the contamination parameter to 0.05, reflecting the known 5% anomaly rate in our training data. At inference time, feature vectors with anomaly scores below the threshold corresponding to the 5th percentile of training scores are flagged as candidate anomalies.

9.2 Autoencoder-Based Detection

The Autoencoder is a neural network trained to compress log event sequence representations into a low-dimensional latent space and reconstruct them with minimal error. When trained exclusively on normal log sequences, the Autoencoder learns to reconstruct normal patterns accurately but produces high reconstruction errors on anomalous sequences that do not conform to the learned normal distribution.

Our Autoencoder takes as input a sliding window of 20 consecutive normalized log event embeddings, each represented as a 32-dimensional vector obtained by embedding the event template and severity level using a pre-trained FastText model. The encoder compresses this 640-dimensional input to a 32-dimensional latent vector through two dense layers; the decoder reconstructs the input from the latent vector through two symmetric layers. The network is trained using the Adam optimizer with a mean squared error loss and early stopping based on validation loss.

9.3 Random Forest for Multi-Class Classification

In addition to the unsupervised detection models, we trained a Random Forest classifier on a labeled subset of 2,000 events to evaluate the potential performance of supervised classification when labeled examples are available. The classifier uses 100 trees with maximum depth 10 and is evaluated on the held-out test set to provide a performance upper bound for comparison with the unsupervised models. Random Forest was selected for this role due to its interpretability through feature importance scores, its robustness to the moderate class imbalance in our labeled subset, and its strong baseline performance on tabular operational data [14].

9.4 Ensemble Combination Strategy

The final anomaly detection decision combines the Isolation Forest score and the Autoencoder reconstruction error using a simple logical OR: a window is flagged as anomalous if either model raises a signal. This ensemble strategy maximizes recall at the cost of some precision, which is appropriate in an operational context where the cost of a missed anomaly typically exceeds the cost of a false positive that an operator can quickly dismiss. A weighted scoring approach that combines both signals into a continuous severity score is used for ranking detected anomalies within the dashboard feed.

Component	Technology / Library	Version
Log Parsing	logparser (Drain)	0.5.0
Data Processing	Python, Pandas, NumPy	3.10 / 2.0 / 1.25
Isolation Forest	Scikit-learn	1.3
Autoencoder	Keras / TensorFlow	2.13 / 2.13
Random Forest Classifier	Scikit-learn	1.3
Graph Database	Neo4j / py2neo	5.0 / 2021.2
Web Framework	Flask / Flask-SocketIO	2.3 / 5.3
Frontend Visualization	Chart.js / D3.js	4.4 / 7.8
Operating System	Ubuntu	22.04 LTS

10. CONTEXT-AWARE LOG ANALYSIS

Context-aware log analysis is the distinguishing characteristic of our framework relative to conventional anomaly detection approaches. The fundamental insight is that the meaning of a log event is inseparable from the context in which it occurs. This section describes how context is represented, incorporated, and used to improve detection accuracy.

10.1 Service Topology Context

We represent the monitored system as a directed graph in which nodes correspond to services and edges encode calling relationships, with edge weights reflecting average call frequency. This topology graph is maintained in a Neo4j graph database and updated automatically through deployment pipeline integration. When an anomaly is detected in a downstream service, the topology graph allows the correlation engine to check whether upstream services are showing concurrent anomaly signals, enabling it to distinguish a localized fault from a propagating failure.

10.2 Temporal Context

Operational log patterns exhibit strong diurnal and weekly periodicity. Request volumes, error rates, and background job activity all vary systematically by time of day and day of week. Anomaly detection that ignores this periodicity will produce false positives during low-traffic periods when any deviation looks dramatic relative to a flat baseline, and false negatives during peak periods when genuine anomalies may be masked by high overall activity levels. Our framework maintains per-service, per-hour-of-week baseline statistics and computes context-adjusted Z-scores that account for the expected level of each metric at the time of the observation.

10.3 Historical Anomaly Fingerprinting

Over time, the framework accumulates a library of resolved anomaly fingerprints: structured descriptions of the multi-source log signatures associated with previously observed and confirmed incidents. When a new anomaly cluster is detected, its log signature is compared against the fingerprint library using cosine similarity of TF-IDF-weighted template frequency vectors. A match above the similarity threshold triggers a known-pattern alert that includes the historical incident identifier, its resolution notes, and the recommended response procedure. This mechanism progressively reduces operator cognitive load as the system accumulates operational history

11. Implementation Details

The framework was implemented entirely in Python 3.10, using a combination of data engineering, machine learning, and web development libraries. The primary components and their corresponding library dependencies are described below.

Log ingestion and normalization were implemented using the Python logging library for local log collection in the test environment, with Pandas DataFrames serving as the in-memory representation of normalized event windows. The Drain log template extraction algorithm was implemented using the logparser library. Feature engineering was implemented using NumPy and Pandas, with vectorized operations over rolling window aggregations.

Table 2: Implementation Technology Stack

The Isolation Forest model was implemented using the IsolationForest class from Scikit-learn version 1.3. Model training, threshold calibration, and inference were all handled within the Scikit-learn pipeline framework. The Autoencoder was implemented using Keras 2.13 with a TensorFlow 2.13 backend, using the Sequential API for model definition and ModelCheckpoint callbacks for best-epoch model persistence.

The signal correlation and ranking engine was implemented as a Python service using a priority queue-based anomaly event buffer with a configurable 10-minute correlation window. The service topology graph queries were executed using the py2neo library against a local Neo4j 5.0 instance. Historical fingerprint comparison used the TfidfVectorizer and cosine_similarity utilities from Scikit-learn.

The operator dashboard was implemented as a Flask 2.3 web application with Flask-SocketIO providing WebSocket support for real-time anomaly feed updates. The frontend was built using Bootstrap 5 and Chart.js for time-series visualization, with D3.js for the interactive service topology map. The dashboard was tested on a Dell PowerEdge server with 32 GB RAM running Ubuntu 22.04 LTS and a Python virtual environment.

12. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We evaluated the proposed framework against three baseline approaches: a threshold-based alerting system configured with rules derived from the 95th percentile of each metric's training distribution; a standalone Isolation Forest model applied to normalized log event features without context enrichment; and a standalone Autoencoder model applied to log event sequences without context enrichment. Performance was measured on the held-out test split of 18,000 events using Precision, Recall, F1-Score, and Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC-ROC).

Table 3: Anomaly Detection Performance Comparison

Method	Precision (%)	Recall (%)	F1-Score (%)	AUC-ROC
Threshold-Based Alerting	68.4	73.2	70.7	0.71
Isolation Forest (No Context)	81.3	78.6	79.9	0.82
Autoencoder (No Context)	79.1	83.4	81.2	0.83
Random Forest (Supervised)	91.8	90.3	91.0	0.94
Proposed Framework (Full)	92.7	95.1	93.9	0.96

The results in Table 3 demonstrate clear and consistent improvements from the proposed framework relative to all baselines. The most significant gain over the strongest single-model baselines (standalone Isolation Forest and standalone Autoencoder) is in recall: the proposed framework achieves 95.1% recall compared to 78.6% and 83.4% for the respective single-model baselines, a difference of 11.7 and 16.5 percentage points. This improvement is attributable primarily to the ensemble combination strategy and the multi-source correlation layer, which together surface compound anomalies that neither individual model detects in isolation.

The precision improvement is more modest but still meaningful: 92.7% versus 81.3% and 79.1% for the single-model baselines. This improvement reflects the benefit of context enrichment in suppressing false positives. Without context, both models generate anomaly signals during expected high-traffic periods and maintenance windows that the context layer correctly identifies as benign. The 21.3-point improvement in F1-Score over threshold-based alerting confirms that machine learning-based approaches substantially outperform rule-based methods for this class of detection problem.

Table 4: Per-Category Anomaly Detection Accuracy

Anomaly Category	True Positives	False Negatives	Detection Rate (%)
Memory Leak Manifestation	238	12	95.2
Cascading Database Error	295	5	98.3
Authentication Latency Spike	216	24	90.0
Abnormal Job Scheduling	187	13	93.5
Multi-Service Correlated Slowdown	208	2	99.0

Table 4 breaks down detection performance by anomaly category. The multi-service correlated slowdown category, which was explicitly designed to require cross-source correlation for detection, achieves the highest detection rate at 99.0%, confirming that the compound anomaly correlation mechanism provides the most value for exactly the class of hidden anomalies this framework targets. The authentication latency spike category shows the lowest detection rate at 90.0%, reflecting the challenge of distinguishing genuine latency degradation from expected peak-hour response time increases, even with temporal context enrichment.

Processing latency measurements showed that the complete pipeline from log ingestion to dashboard anomaly signal averages 2.3 seconds end-to-end on the test infrastructure, which is well within the 10-second threshold we considered acceptable for near-real-time operational monitoring. The Isolation Forest inference step contributes an average of 8 milliseconds per window; the Autoencoder inference contributes an average of 34 milliseconds. The dominant latency contributor is the context enrichment step, particularly the topology graph queries, which average 1.1 seconds and represent the primary optimization target for future work.

13. ADVANTAGES

The proposed framework offers several significant advantages over existing anomaly detection approaches in operational environments. First, the multi-source log correlation capability enables detection of hidden anomalies that span service boundaries, a class of failures that threshold-based and single-source methods consistently miss. This is the primary differentiating capability of the system and the one with the greatest potential impact on mean time to detection in production deployments.

Second, the context enrichment layer substantially reduces false positive rates relative to context-free anomaly detection. By accounting for diurnal and weekly behavioral patterns, the framework avoids alarming operators during expected high-traffic periods or scheduled maintenance windows. This reduction in alert fatigue is itself a meaningful operational benefit, as high false positive rates have been identified as a leading cause of alert desensitization in operations teams [2].

Third, the framework is designed for incremental adoption. Organizations can begin with the log ingestion and Isolation Forest layer and progressively add context enrichment, the Autoencoder model, and the correlation engine as they validate the system's value. This phased deployment path reduces implementation risk and allows teams to build operational confidence in the system before depending on it for critical alerting.

Fourth, the use of unsupervised learning techniques as the primary detection mechanism eliminates the labeled training data requirement that limits the applicability of supervised approaches. Labeled anomaly datasets are rarely available in new deployments, and the operational characteristics of a system change over time in ways that make historically labeled datasets stale. The Isolation Forest and Autoencoder models require only normal operational data for training, which is abundant in any production environment.

14. LIMITATIONS

The framework has several limitations that should be clearly acknowledged. First, the performance results reported in this paper were obtained on a synthetic dataset generated to reflect realistic workload patterns but not validated against actual production log data from a live enterprise system. Generalization to production environments with different workload characteristics, log format diversity, and anomaly distributions cannot be guaranteed without empirical validation on real operational data.

Second, the context enrichment step depends on an accurate and up-to-date service topology graph. In practice, service topologies change frequently in microservice environments, and maintaining the topology graph requires integration with deployment pipeline tooling that may not be available in all organizations. An inaccurate topology graph will degrade the compound anomaly correlation accuracy.

Third, the framework's current implementation does not address the cold-start problem: the Isolation Forest and Autoencoder models require a minimum of 7 to 14 days of normal operational data before they can generate reliable anomaly scores. New services or services that have undergone major behavioral changes due to software updates will not be reliably covered until sufficient operational history has been collected.

Fourth, the current implementation does not incorporate trace data from distributed tracing systems, which would provide additional correlation context for latency-class anomalies. Integration with OpenTelemetry-compatible trace collectors is a natural extension but was outside the scope of the current work.

15. FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS

Several directions for future enhancement are immediately apparent. The most pressing is empirical validation on production log data from real enterprise deployments. We intend to seek research partnerships with organizations willing to share anonymized operational log data and incident records to validate and refine the framework's performance characteristics outside the synthetic evaluation environment.

A second priority is the development of an online learning capability that allows the Isolation Forest and Autoencoder models to adapt continuously to evolving operational patterns without requiring periodic batch retraining. This would address both the cold-start problem for new services and the model drift problem for services whose behavior changes over time.

Third, we plan to integrate distributed trace data as a fourth log source category. Traces provide end-to-end latency decomposition for individual requests that is not available from log data alone, and their incorporation is expected to particularly improve detection accuracy for the latency-spike anomaly class.

Fourth, we intend to enhance the dashboard with natural language explanation generation for detected anomalies, using a fine-tuned language model that can translate the structured evidence underlying each detection into an operator-readable incident summary. This would further reduce the time required for operators to understand and act on anomaly alerts.

Fifth, we plan to evaluate the framework's applicability to security-oriented anomaly detection use cases, where the multi-source correlation and context enrichment capabilities may offer value for detecting intrusion patterns that span multiple system layers.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper has presented a Context-Aware AIOps framework for detecting hidden anomalies in multi-source system logs. The framework addresses three fundamental limitations of existing operational anomaly detection approaches: the inability to harmonize heterogeneous log sources, the lack of contextual awareness that leads to high false positive and false negative rates, and the inability to detect compound anomalies that span service boundaries.

The experimental evaluation on a synthetic dataset of 120,000 log events demonstrated that the full framework, combining multi-source log ingestion, context enrichment, Isolation Forest outlier detection, Autoencoder reconstruction error analysis, and compound anomaly correlation, achieves an F1-Score of 93.9% and an AUC-ROC of 0.96, outperforming all evaluated baselines including supervised Random Forest classification on a labeled subset. The framework shows particular strength in detecting multi-service correlated anomalies, the hidden failure class that motivates the research, with a detection rate of 99.0%.

The anomaly detection gap in current IT operations tooling is not primarily a data availability problem. The logs are there; the challenge is analyzing them in context and correlating them across sources. We believe that context-aware, multi-source analysis represents a practically deployable path toward meaningfully earlier detection of the operational anomalies that cost organizations significant downtime and recovery expense each year. The framework presented here is a step in that direction, and we hope it serves as both a useful reference for practitioners and a foundation for further academic investigation.

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