

Detect and Prevent MANET from Wormhole Attack Using Profile Oriented Approach

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Abstract:

A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a self-organizing network in which movable nodes are connected via wireless links. Absence of central controller it is difficult to determine the reliable & secure communication in Mobile Ad hoc network. Worm hole attack that are work as to established path in between sender and receiver but if the sender has start data transmission then in that case the worm hole attacker has create a direct link, referred to as a wormhole tunnel between them, it means more of the number of trusted nodes it means higher successful data communication process rates may well expected. In this paper, we propose an approach for detection as well as prevention technique against wormhole attack, for detection we use profile base detection technique and get attacker node information like node number, number of attack packet, attack time etc. after that we prevent wormhole attack using neighbor trust worthy base technique and secure the mobile ad-hoc network communication, through our proposal we provide secure as well as reliable communication and simulate through network simulator-2 (NS-2) and analyze the network behavior in attack and prevention approach

Keywords-MANET, routing, performancemetrics, wormhole, NS-2.

I. INTRODUCTION

Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) are infrastructure-less collections of mobile nodes that can randomly change their location, as network follows dynamic topologies and resource-constrained random mobility. If two nodes are located too far and direct communication does not possible then it requires an intermediate node for establishing a link. Multi-hop routing and an open working environment make MANET vulnerable to attack by selfish or malicious nodes. A major area of research in mobile ad-hoc networks is to provide a trusted environment and secure communications.

There are some ad-hoc network applications that require highly secure communications. Common uses of MANET include: Military or police networks, business activities such as oil rigs and mining operations, and emergency response

In wormhole attack, the attacker record the packets(bits)at one location and tunnel them in another location in same network or indifferent networks. The attacker can transfer each bit directly, without waiting the entire packet. It is very difficult to find out the location of wormhole attack without having packet relay information or without known infrastructure of routing protocols.

This paper is arranged in following manner: Section II covers the analysis of routing protocols. Section III describes the literature review. Section IV is explaining proposed approach of research and Section V describes the simulation environment. Section VI declare the details of simulation results and finally Conclusion and future work is given in Section VII.

II. ANALYSIS OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Here are basically three types of routing protocols: reactive routing protocols, proactive routing protocols, and hybrid routing protocols. A proactive or table-driven routing protocol allows each node to continuously maintain up-to-date routes to all other nodes in the network. Routing information is periodically sent across the network to keep routing tables consistent. So if the route already exists before the traffic arrives, the transmission happens without delay. Proactive protocols have the disadvantage of requiring additional control traffic to continuously update stale route entries. Network topologies are dynamic, so when a link fails, all paths using that link are broken and must be repaired. If there are no applications using these paths, repair efforts can be considered futile.

In contrast to the proactive approach, in reactive or on-demand protocols, a node initiates route discovery across the network only when it wants to send a packet to its destination. To do this, the node initiates a route discovery process through the network. The process is complete when the route is determined or all possible permutations have been explored. Once a route is established, it is maintained by a route maintenance process until the destination along each path from the source becomes inaccessible or the route is no longer needed. In a reactive scheme, nodes maintain routes to active destinations. A route search is required for each unknown destination.

Finally, in the hybrid protocol, each node maintains both topology information within a zone and information related to neighboring zones. This means active behavior within zones and reactive behavior between zones.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

Pallavi Sharma et al. [2] described An approach to defending against wormhole attacks in ad-hoc networks using digital signatures. Wormhole attacks in ad-hoc networks, i.e. a receiving node breaking a sending node's digital signature, since every legitimate node in the network contains the digital signatures of all other legitimate nodes in the same network. Represents a mechanism that helps with validation. Wormhole is one of the most prominent attacks, consisting of two

malicious nodes and her one tunnel. To defend against wormhole attacks, we used a scheme called Multi-Hop Counting Analysis (MHA) to verify legitimate nodes in the network through digital signatures.

Hussain et al. [5] suggested DoS Attacks in AODV & Friend Features Feature Extraction for Designing Detection Engines of Intrusion Detection Systems in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. In this work, denial-of-service attacks are applied to networks, evidence is collected, and an intrusion detection engine is developed for the MANET Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The true positives produced by the detection engine are very high and the false positives are suppressed very little. True positives are reported very quickly in Lids, and the friends list generated by Lids is sent to the Gid engine for further investigation. The global detection engine generates friends lists according to trust level. A node's higher trust level can be used for various other processes such as routing and determines the cluster head of a scalable ad-hoc network. The features extracted for routing parameters and MANET traffic generation parameters can be used for various routing protocols.

Jing-Wei Huang et al. [6], Proposed trust-based AOMDV secure routing with multiple paths in ad-hoc networks. In this work, trust-based multipath AOMDV routing is used in combination with soft encryption, resulting in the so-called T-AOMDV scheme.

- (1) In message encryption, at the source node, the message is split into three parts and these parts are encrypted together using some XOR operation. In forwarding a
- (2) message, the routed parts of the message are routed separately over different trust-based multipaths using the new node isolation AOMDV protocol.
- (3) In message decryption, the destination node decrypts portions of the message to recover the original message.

Shreenath et al. [7], described Countermeasures against multicast attacks against MANET's enhanced on-demand multicast routing protocol.

This work focuses on hardening the Secure Enhanced-On Demand Multicast Routing Protocol (EODMRP) to protect against flooding and blackhole attacks. The proposed flooding attack mechanism works even when the identity of the malicious node is unknown and consumes no additional network bandwidth. Small multicast group performance is severely degraded in these types of attacks, even with solutions available.

Sujatha et al. [8], proposed Genetic algorithm based IDS design for MANET. In this paper, we analyse AODV's vulnerability to attacks, especially black hole attacks, which are the most common threats at the network layer, and develop a specification-based intrusion detection system (IDS) using a genetic algorithm approach. Develop a method to develop. . The proposed system is based on a genetic algorithm that analyses each node's behaviour and provides details about the attack. The Genetic Algorithm Control (GAC) is a set of different rules based on the intrinsic properties of AODV, such as: Request forward rate, reply receiving rate, etc..

Konate et al. [9], described Modeling and Simulation for Attack Analysis in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. This title introduces a work dedicated to investigating and countering attacks on MANET. They presented several alternatives to the DOS attacks encountered in MANET, their operational flow, the mechanisms used to counter these attacks and the protocols to implement.

Gandhewar et al. [10], described Sinkhole attack detection and prevention against AODV protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. This paper mainly focus on the sinkhole problem and its consequences, presenting its detection and prevention mechanisms in the context of the AODV protocol. Sinkholes are one of the most serious types of attacks that attract large portions of network traffic and attempt to degrade network performance. Also throughput, PDR, end-to-end delay and packet loss

Sharma et al. [11], described Efficient prevention of black hole issues in MANET's AODV routing

protocol. This paper presents a solution to black hole attacks in ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing in MANET, one of the most popular routing algorithms. Black hole attacks are one of these security risks. In this attack, a malicious node spoofs the shortest route to the target node and disrupts communication. The proposed method uses promiscuous mode to detect malicious nodes (black holes).

Jian-Ming Chang et al. [12], described CBDS: A cooperative decoy detection scheme to prevent MANET malicious nodes based on a hybrid defense architecture. They presented a mechanism for detecting malicious nodes launching black/gray hole attacks and cooperative black hole attacks, known as the Cooperative Bait Detection Scheme (CBDS). Integrates proactive and reactive defense architectures, working randomly with probabilistic neighbors. By using the neighboring node's address as the decoy target address, it decoys the malicious node to send a RREP back and detects the malicious node through the proposed reverse tracer, thus preventing the attack

IV. PROPOSED APPROACH

In this section, we explain an algorithm which prevent the overall network from wormhole attack. Firstly we set normal ad-hoc network parameter and then set criteria of wormhole attack scheme and spread attack onto the network.

Set mobile Node = N; //Mobile Nodes

Sender Nodes = S; // $S \in N$;

Destination Nodes = D; // $D \in N$;

Routing Protocol = AODV;

Set Simulation Time = T

Set Radio Range = RR; // Initialize Radio Range

AODV_RREQ_B (S, D, RR)

```
{  
If ((rr<=550) && (next hop >0))
```

```
{  
Compute route ()
```

```
{  
rtable->insert(rtable->rt_nexthop); // next hop to  
RREQ source
```

```
if (next_hop work correct route to destination )  
{
```

```

next_hop(S,next_hop,D)
{
Next_hop_rtable=rtable ; // if in future RREP
Sends via //link
}
Next_hop_RREQ_B    ->    till    the
Destinaionreachable ;
rtable1->insert(rtable1->rt_nexthop); // nexthop
to RREQ destination
if (dest==true)
{ sendack to source node with rtable1;

Data_packet_send(s_no, nexthop, type)
}
else {
destination not found;
}
}
Else
{// Wormhole Node spread route misbehavior
module;
Set misbehavior node = W1, W2; //W1 next to
sender and W2 neighbor of W1 both
cooperatively work and both belong in between
S to D and W1 and W2 both set high
transmission power
If (W1 in radio range && active &&
transmission == High)
{
If ( next hop W2 is next neighbour of RREQ_B
Sender)
{
Update routing Table;
Increase Hop count++;
}
Send W1 certainly RREP to S;
S next RREQ to Next hop other Than W1 ;
RREQ_Receive -> W2 //Other Than W1
Send RREP (W1 is best path to destination)
//Sender sends data packets through W1 ,W2
path to D
Data_packet_send(s_no, nexthop, type)
{
if (Data type ==”UDP”)
{ discard data Pkts ;
}
}
Else { Block The data pakts ; }
}
}
}
}

```

```

}
Else {
destination un-reachable;
}
}
}
A. Profile Oriented Prevention from Wormhole hole
Attack
We apply profile base detection and route trust
base prevention technique, for securing data
communication. very first we generate normal
activity profile and compare with new generated
profile if not match that means our new arrival
data is unsecure data and we get particular
attacker node and if we found attacker node than
we apply route trust mechanism and block the
attacker node and prevent the our network
communication against wormhole attack.
While ( S send RREQ_B)
{ rtable -> insert(rtable->rt_nexthop);
Add extra filed to rtable (next_hop , Through)
//both value 1 , 0 formate
If (new_profile == base_profile)
{
No any attack
}
Else If( (next_hop = true)&&
(through == true)&&(send_D_pkt==true)&&
(new_profile == base_profile))
{
True route ;
}
Else if ((next_hop = false)&&
(through == false)&&
(new_profile != base_profile))
{
In previous No data and route through that hop;
Insert into ->rtable; // for route to destination if
shortest path
Cerate new Profile;
}
Elseif ((next_hop = true) && (through == false)
&& (send_D_pkt==true))
{
In previous No data through that hop;
But exist in rtableentry ;
//Check reliability
if next hop(new_profile != base_profile);
{
Block that Hop ;
}
}
}
}

```

```

else
{
Send RREQ_B till the Destination }
}
Else
{
Send_RREQ_B to next other hop ;
Search destination D;
}
}

```

V. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT

All simulations were performed using the network simulator ns 2.31[10]. This is a separate event-driven simulator. The purpose of NS-2 is to support networking research and education. NS-2 was built using the object-oriented language C++ and OTcl (the object-oriented variant of the Tool Command Language). NS-2 interprets simulation scripts written in OTcl. The user writes the simulation as his OTcl script.

A. Simulation Parameters

Table1 shows the parameter that has been set during simulation. In case of normal routing, consider all 30 nodes but in case of wormhole attack consider 2 nodes as a attacker and remaining 28 are normal nodes and in case of IPS one node is IPD node, 2 nodes are attacker and rest of them are normal.

TABLE I
Simulation Parameters

Simulator Used	NS-2.31
Number of nodes	30
IPS node	1
Wormhole Attacker	2
Dimension of simulated area (meters)	800 × 600
Routing Protocol	AODV
Simulation time	100 sec.
Traffic type (TCP & UDP)	FTP & CBR
Packet size	512 bytes
Number of traffic connections	3 TCP, 2 UDP
Node movement at maximum Speed	random & 20 m/s
Transmission range	250m

VI. SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation results are evaluated on the basis of performance parameters like overhead, throughput etc. The simulation results are measured in case of normal AODV routing, in case of wormhole attack and after applying protection IPS scheme.

A. Packet Delivery Ratio analysis in case of Normal, Wormhole and IPS

This figure represents the packet delivery rate (PDR) analysis for normal AODV routing, for wormhole attacks, and for IPS (intrusion prevention system) schemes. Only considered if performance is deemed consistent. Application of protection schemes. Here we have clearly visualized the impact of a wormhole attack in our network. In the early stages of the simulation, only about 30% packet delivery is possible in the network, after which the network performance is almost zero, and then about 50%. Seconds The PDF value is not measured on the network. However, in the case of application of the protection scheme i.e. IPS, network performance is about the same as normal. This means that the PDR improved by about 94% after applying the security scheme against attacks.




Fig.1 PDR Analysis

B. Routing load analysis

The routing load analysis is required to find the number of routing packets is delivering in network to established connection in between sender and receiver. In this graph the routing load or number of routing packets in case of IPS

are high almost about 1300 routing packets are deliver in network then next in case of normal routing about 900 routing packets are deliver in network but at last the routing load in case of wormhole attack are minimum about only 500 packets are deliver in network. The important point of normal routing is the minimum value of routing packets are show the better performance in network and this performance is determine in case of attack and the important point is that in minimum routing packets the actual data packets are deliver in network are negligible as compare to normal and IPS routing. In case IPS the routing packets are more deliver because of identifying the secure path for communication.




Fig. 2 Routing overhead Analysis

C. UDP Packet Receive analysis in case of Normal, Wormhole and IPS

This graph represents the UDP Packet analysis in case of Normal, Wormhole attack and IPS scheme. Because of the connection less nature the UDP protocol are not reliable for communication but network conditions are better than in that case the UDP. Here the UDP packets are almost equally received in case of attack and IPS i.e. about 2300 and 2200 but in case of wormhole attack only a single packet is received at about 60 seconds, it means negligible packets are received at destination end in presence of attack.




Fig.3 UDP packet receive analysis

D. Infection from Wormhole

Infection percentage represents the infection percentage w.r.t time. Infection percentage in case of worm attack is continuously increases reach up to 49%. At time about after 4 sec. the infection are in maximum percentage value but at the time of IPS the infection percentage is zero and not a single packet is affected by wormhole attack. IPS will block the whole activity of wormhole attack and remove the infection from network.




Fig.4 Infection Percentage

E. TCP analysis of AODV Routing Protocol

Transmission Control Protocol (TDP) are the connection oriented reliable protocol for communication in network in between sender and receiver. There are three TCP connections are created in network and the performance of all the connections is measurable. The congestion window of TCP 2 connection are high means about more than 70 packets are deliver in network, after that the

congestion window of TCP 1 are size of about 20 and at last the size of TCP 3 connection congestion window are about 1 packet.




Fig.5.TCP packetperformanceofAODVRoutingProtocol

F. TCP Packet Analysis incase of Wormhole Attack

InthisgraphtheTCP1,TCP2 and TCP3 connection packets are shown in this graph, only the 6 packets of TCP3 connections at time about 2 seconds are deliver in network after that no ta single packet are deliver in network. It means the wormhole attack completely fails the network performance of reliable protocol.




Fig.6.TCPPacket Analysis incase ofWormholeAttack

G. TCP Packet analysis in case of IPS Scheme

This graph represents the TCP packets analysis in case of applying prevention scheme against wormhole attack. Here we clearly notice the performance of all TCP connections. The size of congestion window is only varying but the packet delivery is almost same as normal routing i.e.shown in figure 5.The Protection IPS scheme is definitely improve the performance of

network and blocks them is behaviour activity of wormhole attacker.




Fig.7.TCP packetsdeliveryofIPS Scheme

H.Summary incase ofnormal routing, wormhole attackandIPSScheme

The table 2 presents the summary of performance of normal routing, wormhole attack and IPS scheme are presented here in the foam of performance parameters.

Table II

Performance Parameters	Normal AODV Routing	Wormhole Attack	IPS Scheme
Packets Send	5946.00	2491.00	5691.00
Packets Receive	5762.00	7.00	5376.00
Routing Packets	853.00	563.00	1358.00
PDF	96.91	0.28	94.46
NRL	0.15	80.43	0.25
Average e-e delay(ms)	432.70	37.89	837.73
Number of Data Drop	179	2484	311

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Mobile ad-hoc networks have the ability to set up networks in harsh environments where traditional network infrastructure cannot be deployed. Regardless of the great potential of ad-hoc networks, there are still many challenges to overcome. Security is a very important feature and can determine the success and

adoption of MANET. A wormhole attack is a type of attack that performs malicious activity by creating its own links and breaking the actual links. i.e. the actual path of data transmission. The basic idea of this algorithm is that malicious nodes launch attacks, detect link malfunctions, and disconnect them from the communication network. This protection scheme provides protection against wormhole attacks and blocks attacker node activity. In the event of an attack, the network performance would be almost completely lost, but the proposed IPS scheme would improve performance almost as much as regular routing. This work explores a vigorous and very simple idea that can be implemented and tested against more attacks in the future by increasing the number of nodes in the network. In the future, we will also study the behavior of other attacks such as gray hole and black hole attacks, try to build protection schemes against them, and improve the performance of the routing protocols considered in this paper, trying to improve routing. ability.

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